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Bailey Full Document Preface The scholarly understanding of presidential power rests on two distinctions. The first distinction concerns the extent of the president's formal powers and the place of the presidency in the constitutional order.
The other distinction contrasts the Founders' presidency against the modern presidency by emphasizing the extraconstitutional powers of twentieth-century presidents.
The first distinction is often characterized as arising from the differences in the political thought of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, that is, between a generous and a narrow reading of the Constitution's grant of authority to the president. The second distinction supposes that the modern presidency escaped from the constraints imposed by the Founders' careful plan to separate and check power by looking beyond the Founders' Constitution for its resources and became, in some cases, precisely what the Founders tried to prevent.
Because recent presidents eagerly exploit the constitutional hinges that allow the presidency to be strong, and because they bolster this strength with extraconstitutional devices, it is easy to conclude that the current presidency is both Hamiltonian and modern.
As this scholarly understanding of the presidency puts it, Hamilton's case for implied powers, with its broad reading of the vesting clause in Article One, opened the space for later presidents to claim, as Theodore Roosevelt did, that they possess any power, not forbidden by the Constitution, to act on behalf of the people and for FDR to argue that the presidency needs the institutional resources to secure rights under modern conditions.
But this formulation points to an obvious difficulty: The modern presidency is both powerful and popular, but the one seems to undermine the other.
Because elections have become more democratic, and because the science of polling allows, as Dick Morris taught us, "every day" to be "election day in modern America," a president can be both caretaker and creature of the popular will.
Yet presidents increasingly rely on secrecy and administrative fiat to pursue their ambitions. Presidents use executive orders to avoid working with Congress, and, since Watergate, presidents have asserted executive privilege while calling it something else. Among scholars and presidents, the current understanding of the war power is that the president, not Congress, is responsible for determining when the nation is at peace or war.
At the same time, presidents appeal to the people to justify their policies and their extraordinary acts of executive power. Moreover, several scholars have found that the modern and premodern classifications rest on an uneasy theoretical foundation. And, as Stephen Skowronek has written, the distinction between the Founders' presidency and the modern presidency fails to appreciate the more serious similarities among presidents who face similar political challenges, namely being associated with or opposed to a resilient or vulnerable regime.
Twentieth-century presidents have new tools, but does this make them new? More important, even though modern presidents employ methods in the spirit of the Hamiltonian presidency, they have not wholeheartedly embraced it. FDR, for example, appealed to Hamilton's defense of national power only after discrediting Hamilton's suspicion of democracy.
Although Hamilton's reputation as an opponent of democracy is perhaps undeserved, his reasoning in The Federalist No. Where is the president who will say in public, as TR did in private, that the people's love of Jefferson is a discredit to his country?
The Problem with Inventing the Presidency More than relics of a lost world, such questions force us to examine the heart of the modern presidency.
Today, presidents use their elections to claim a mandate from the people; they claim that the Constitution confers upon them the ultimate power of defending the Constitution and therefore tacitly grants them the power to use any means to do so; they appeal directly to the people to get Congress to pass their proposals and to encourage executive officials to do their bidding; and they carefully cultivate public opinion in order to make these appeals more useful.
These aspects of the modern presidency are well known and well studied, but they can be better understood with reference to their institutional origins.
The case for mandates presumes a particular kind of presidential selection and would have been incomprehensible under the original Electoral College; the argument for the constitutionality of executive prerogative requires a particular understanding of the relationship between necessity and fundamental law; and appeals to the public had to first be defended as a legitimate, and useful, practice in democratic government.
Even a quick reading of the Constitution and its interpretation in The Federalist reveals that none of these developments can be taken for granted.
Rather, somebody had to invent them. But, as scholars affiliated with American Political Development argue, such inventions come about at particular intersections between political and institutional paths.
Or, as Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek put it, instead of searching for "prime movers and master organizing mechanisms," scholars would do well to present "more circumspect specifications of order. According to one interpretation, equal apportionment reflects the sovereign status of the states.
According to another, the apportionment scheme grew out of the primary concern for the size of the Senate, which was paramount because the Senate was meant to be an elite body in the style of the House of Lords.
But if Frances E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer are to be believed, such functional accounts should be replaced by one more attentive to "path dependency. The same has been said of presidential leadership. Presidents can be agents of institutional change, yet the opportunities for change are confined by historical contingencies and previously traveled paths.
But, as the example of equal apportionment in the Senate suggests, the attractiveness of path dependency is also its danger. It can include rival, functional, interpretations even as it attempts to explain events as "historical contingencies. All this is to say that the third president provides an important case study for those who study institutional development.Home» Difference Between Jefferson and Jackson.
Difference Between Jefferson and Jackson. and there were great similarities in the policies of these two towering personalities of US polity. However, there were also differences . The Berlin Wall—symbol of a divided city within a divided nation within a divided continent—was grounded in decades-old historical divisions at the end of World War II.
Keep Learning. What Are the Similarities Between Hamilton and Jefferson? What Did Thomas Jefferson Do? What Led to the Duel Between Alexander Hamilton and . Get an answer for 'What are the similarities between Jackson and Jefferson?' and find homework help for other History questions at eNotes.
Differences Andrew Jackson and Thomas Jefferson Similarities: U.S.
presidents - They both wanted to expand the U.S. - both owned slaves-Both wanted to get rid of the National Bank-Differences-Jefferson wasnt a people person Jefferson vs.
Jackson The debate between. Yup. The reason we have states rather than provinces is because they weren’t supposed to just be administrative units but (semi-)sovereign polities.A bunch of little countries committed to common defense, with a single shared currency and freedom of movement between them.